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1. Introduction 
 
Political objectives will always be involved where a body or organisation is 
intergovernmental and where government delegates, rather than independent 
experts, represent their countries. The government delegates at the Council have 
responsibility and accountability to their national governments rather than to the UN.1 
Oberleitner remarks that it is unsurprising and somewhat inevitable that an 
intergovernmental body comprised of state representatives acts along political lines.2 
The difference between politics and politicisation hinges on the extent to which 
national objectives are related to the subject matter at hand. Politicisation of 
international organisations has been defined as introducing unrelated controversial 
issues into the body.3 Of course, countries will always seek to advance national 
objectives, but pernicious politicisation occurs when states introduce unrelated 
objectives that undermine the body’s mandate. Extreme politicisation may result in 
bodies losing credibility, becoming ineffective, or even delegitimising their own 
processes.4  
 
The Council has been politicised from its outset. Politicisation has been apparent 
through countries advancing unrelated political objectives, groups shielding their allies 
from Council scrutiny, and politically-motivated attacks on some states that have 
obstructed similar action being taken on other, needed, situations.5 The Council’s 
structure and composition contributes to its politicisation. The frequent use of group 
tactics, such as repetitious statements, bloc voting, and vote-bartering,6 undermines 
the legitimacy of some, if not many, Council discussions and actions. Assessment of 
the Council’s first decade must entail scrutiny of the extent to which politicisation 
undermines the body fulfilling its mandate. Criticising the Council in this regard does 
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not negate the body’s positive achievements, but it is important to identify the 
politicisation issues in order to suggest methods for improvement. There have been a 
number of institutional reforms, which attempt to reduce politicisation, but there are 
prevailing fault lines that are a result of systemic weaknesses and cannot be ignored.  
 
Throughout the Council’s early years it seemed as though the new body would be little 
more than old wine in new bottles.7 The selectivity, bias and politicisation manifested 
somewhat differently than at the Commission, but it was no less pervasive or 
pernicious. Many states, observers, scholars and civil society organisations sounded 
the death knells for a body that was only just being birthed. The Council’s credibility 
was undermined by events like the Special Session on Sri Lanka in 20098 and by the 
body’s failure even to mention human rights abuses linked to the Beijing Olympics or 
to the Russian incursions in Georgia and South Ossetia. The turning point came with 
the Arab Spring uprisings in 2010 and the fracturing of the dominant political bloc at 
the Council.9 
 
The Council seemingly became less politicised with a second wave of membership 
after the Arab Spring began. Fragmented regional groups and political blocs, largely 
owing to disunity and disharmony amongst the Organisation of the Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC), led to greater cross-regional co-operation. Between the Council’s 
19th and 21st Sessions Israel was raised less in discussions,10 as fewer tactics were 
used to divert attention away from other human rights abuses.11 Instead, the Council 
devoted more time to discussing the Arab states,12 resulting in an increase in the 
number of resolutions on those states.13 At the same time the US engaged with the 
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Council, and many of the more moderate states, particularly from Latin America and 
Africa, found their voices. During those years the Council was more able to focus on 
fulfilling its mandate through a range of activities. Special Sessions became more 
broadly focused, regular sessions included panels and discussions on emerging human 
rights issues, and regional groups and political blocs became less polarised from one 
another and took joint, effective actions to protect and promote rights.  
 
Those steps forward demonstrate that the body’s potential may be harnessed. 
Membership of more moderate states was crucial to this improved atmosphere, as 
was a clearer understanding of the institution’s working methods that had been 
negotiated and produced during the Council’s early sessions. Despite those strides 
forward, politicisation persisted in relation to some key issues. Selectivity in the 
Council’s dealings with Syria,14 as compared with other similar situations in the Middle 
East, is one significant example of how the Council ignored its founding principles in 
terms of country situations. Others include the Council’s treatment of Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) rights,15 and the ways in which states have 
selectively treated non-governmental organisations (NGOs) speaking at the body 
when those organisations have raised issues to which the dominant blocs object.16 In 
particular, the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), when it attempted to 
use its intervention to draw attention to reprisals against a human rights defender in 
China,17 and UN Watch, when it has drawn repeated attention to the gross 
politicisation against Israel, have effectively been silenced by states selectively using 
procedural points to interrupt and undermine their interventions.18 In the sections that 
follow we address some of the key sites for politicisation at the Council, exploring how 
politicisation has been manifested, its impact upon the body’s work and credibility, 
and how such politicisation represents backwards steps at the UN’s principal human 
rights body. 
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were-you-when-assad-starved-and  (accessed 3rd May 2016). 
 2. Forum for Dialogue  
 
In the run up to its establishment, it was envisaged that the Human Rights Council 
would be a new forum for ‘constructive international dialogue’ on human rights.19 It 
would be a transparent, deliberative body, which embraced the principles of 
universality and impartiality.20 It would be objective in its work, and would foster 
cooperation between states to protect and promote human rights.21 The Council 
signalled a move away from ‘naming and shaming’ techniques that had dominated the 
Commission towards ‘genuine dialogue’ and inter-state cooperation.22 This focus on 
dialogue and cooperation, as a response to the failures of the Commission, is a step 
forward in terms of engaging states and promoting rights within a constructive 
atmosphere. In practice, however, politicisation of some if not many discussions has 
resulted in dialogues being hijacked by the tactics of states seeking to derail the 
Council’s work.  
The UN Commission for Human Rights was discredited for being politicised. It was 
criticised for its selectivity and double standards23 and regional alliances and the use 
of bloc voting prevented discussion on the human rights situation in particular 
countries.24 Political or group tactics gave rise to a lack of transparency, as 
‘negotiations took place in meetings or consultations outside of the plenary’.25 The 
problem with these side-room negotiations is that draft resolutions were written and 
presented by governments without thorough discussion about the situation in the 
country.26 Within the Commission, there had developed a practice of ‘naming and 
shaming’ states. States would condemn others for human rights violations so as to 
place political pressure on a particular country and undermine their international 
reputation. Whilst calling out states can have a positive influence on human rights 
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protection,27 the selectivity with which the Council used ‘naming and shaming’ 
undermined its utility. In the calls for reform of the Commission, and in the 
establishment of the Council, emphasis was placed on the need for credibility.  
The suggested reforms to enhance the credibility of the Council placed weight on the 
need for ‘peer review’,28  dialogue,29 and accountability. The Secretary-General urged 
that the new Council was ‘more accountable and more representative’.30 This echoed 
broader calls for reform across international organisations, where civil society actors 
were demanding increased participation and accountability.31 The Council’s mandate 
reflects this ethos of legitimacy through the inclusivity invoked by the increased 
geographical representation of states, the founding principles, and the participation of 
non-state actors explored in Section 4.   
The work of the Council is guided by its founding principles of ‘universality, impartiality, 
objectivity and non-selectivity, constructive international dialogue and cooperation’.32 
The preparatory work to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/251, 
which created the Human Rights Council, shows that negotiations centred on the role 
of dialogue in the new human rights body.33 The Council is mandated to ‘[s]erve as a 
forum for dialogue on thematic issues on all human rights’34 and throughout the 
mandate and the Institutional Building Package dialogue is at the core.35 The focus on 
transparency, participation and inclusiveness fosters a veil of legitimacy.36 Whilst this 
air of legitimacy is suggestive of a step forward, the reforms did not go far enough to 
combat politicisation.  
Firstly, the founding principles do little to curb the behaviour of states. Those principles 
were created as guidelines for the body’s work and as a method for combatting 
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31 See for example, Anne Peters, ‘Towards Transparency as a Global Norm’ in Andrea Bianchi and Anne Peters 
(eds), Transparency in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 607; Christian Guillermet Fernández 
and David Fernández Puyana, ‘The Principles of Transparency and Inclusiveness as pillars of Global Governance’ 
(2015) 11(2) BRICS Law Journal 7, 21. 
32 GA Res. 60/251, ‘Human Rights Council’, 15 March 2006, UN Doc. A/RES/60/251, para 4 
33 UNGA Official Records, ‘72nd Plenary Meeting’, 15 March 2006, UN Doc. A/60/PV 72. See also Bertrand G 
Ramcharan, The Law, Policy and Politics of the UN HRC  (Brill, 2015) 2-3 
34 GA Res. 60/251, ‘Human Rights Council’, 15 March 2006, UN Doc. A/RES/60/251, para. 5(b). 
35 HRC Resolution 5/1, ‘Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council’, 18 June 2007, UN Doc. 
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36 ‘A norm produced by the Human Rights Council, through a transparent procedure and inclusiveness, will 
always have higher legitimacy’ in Christian Guillermet Fernández and David Fernández Puyana, ‘The Principles of 
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politicisation. They divide into two broad categories: principles that guide its work on 
human rights, and principles that guide its relationship to individual states. However, 
they are open-ended and somewhat ethereal, indicating that they are guidelines rather 
than precise requirements to which states must adhere. There is no definition of 
dialogue and cooperation within the Council mandate, and there is little consensus on 
the meaning of transparency and inclusiveness in international law.37 States can simply 
ignore or manipulate these principles, rather than adhere to them. Without clear 
requirements, states can hide behind the idea of dialogue,38 effectively doing little else 
other than talking about human rights. Dialogue becomes a positive outcome rather 
than demanding human rights protection. As Lebovic and Voeten argue, ‘states might 
acquire reputations as law-abiding global citizens by consistently participating in 
international institutions’.39 The principles are weak and subject to manipulation by 
states, which means they do little to enhance human rights.40   
Secondly, the reformed membership of the Council did not address the political 
alliances that had given rise to politicisation at the Commission. The Council is 
constituted of 47 member states, elected from regional groups.41 There are 13 seats 
for states from the Group of African States, 13 seats for the Group of Asian States, 6 
seats for the Group of Eastern European States, 8 for the Group of Latin American and 
Caribbean States, and 7 for the Group of Western European and other States.42 
Resolution 60/251 focuses on UN regional groups in apportioning seats to members 
in an attempt to achieve ‘equitable geographical distribution’,43 but it serves to 
reinforce the strong political allegiances within groups. There are also alliances 
between groups, as had occurred at the Commission, which often results in what 
Schrijver identifies as ‘the Rest against the West’.44 
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40 For example, at the 16th Special Session on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, the first Special Session 
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41 GA Res. 60/251, ‘Human Rights Council’, 15 March 2006, UN Doc. A/RES/60/251, para 7  
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid para 7 
44 N. Schrijver, ‘The UN Human Rights Council: A New ‘Society of the Committed’ or Just Old Wine in New 
Bottles’ (2007) 20(4) Leiden Journal of International Law 809, 812. 
Other powerful political coalitions also operate within the Council.45 Non-
geographically-based alliances occur among both developed and developing states.46 
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the G-77, which were the traditional Global 
South political blocs during the Cold War,47 remain loosely allied at the Council but 
largely have given way to the OIC, the G20+, the BRICS, and the Like-Minded Group 
of Developing Countries (LMG) in terms of where the political power is vested. OIC 
dominance of proceedings, the European Union’s passivity,48 and the undermining 
actions of the LMG have negatively impacted upon the Council’s work.49 Of those, the 
OIC and the LMG have been the most active in terms of politicising the Council to 
achieve objectives largely or fully unrelated to human rights. The alliances generally 
have had a negative effect on the Council’s ability to take action.50 States holding 
membership of more than one group, especially those with large membership, have 
many allies to protect them from action. States use repeated statements, supporting 
statements, irrelevant statements, and statements of alliance and allegiance to reduce 
the utility of dialogues at the Council.51  
 
The Council’s politicisation is attributable both to its membership and its structure. 
Understanding the Council as a forum for dialogue allows for an air of legitimacy – it 
appears to foster inclusion, participation and transparency - and yet this structural 
form does little to prevent politicisation. In 2006, Abraham argued that overcoming 
politicisation at the Council would be difficult because it relates to the ‘culture and 
practices adopted by member states’.52 This means that it is not something that can 
be rectified by changes to ‘working methods’ alone. She suggested that the Council 
                                                 
45 D. Nicol, ‘Interregional Co-ordination Within the United Nations: The Role of the Commonwealth’ in B. 
Andemicael (ed.), Regionalism and the United Nations, (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y: Oceana Publications Ltd, 1979), at 
102. 
46 T. G. Weiss, What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It (Polity Press, 2008), 50. 
47 M. T. Berger, ‘After the Third World? History, Destiny and the Fate of Third Worldism’, 25 Third World 
Quarterly (2004) 1, at 13. 
48 Article 34(1) of Treaty of European Union states that EU Member States ‘shall coordinate their action in 
international organisations and […] shall uphold the common positions in such forums’. See, Karen E Smith, 
‘Speaking with One Voice? European Union Co-ordination on Human Rights Issues at the United Nations’ (2006) 
44 JCMS 113 
49 R Freedman, The UN Human Rights Council Chapters 6 and 8. 
50 Cf. S. Hug & R. Lukacs, ‘Preferences or blocs? Voting in the United Nations Human Rights Council’, 9 The 
Review of International Organizations (2014) 1, at 83-106. 
51 At an Interactive Dialogue with the Commission of Inquiry on Libya on 19 September 2011, states from the 
Arab Group repeatedly welcomed and congratulated the NTC in Libya. See, Human Rights Council News Archive, 
‘Human Rights Council holds interactive dialogue with Commission of Inquiry on Libya’, 19 September 2011.  An 
example of an irrelevant statement arose at the 4th Special Session on the Situation in Darfur on 12th December 
2006, when Palestine drew attention to the situation in Israel. See, Rosa Freedman, The United Nations Human 
Rights Council 223. This sort of practice still occurs at the Council and on 28 February 2012, in an Urgent Debate 
on Syria, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Secretary-General drew attention to the situation in 
Palestine. See, Human Rights Council hears statements from 17 dignitaries as it continues its High-Level 
Segment: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11883&;LangID=E 
52 Meghna Abraham, A New Chapter for Human Rights: A Handbook on Issues of Transition from the 
Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council  (International Service for Human Rights, Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, 2006) 28. 
would need to adopt methods that did not reinforce the regional structure,53 and 
moreover it seems clear 10 years later that the focus on regionalism in the Council’s 
constituent instrument has given rise to politicisation through the dominance of 
regional groups and political blocs. 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Country-Specific Situations 
 
A vital aspect of the Council’s work is scrutiny of country situations within which grave 
or ongoing violations occur. Such scrutiny seeks to uncover and share information 
about human rights abuses as well as to devise strategies and to place pressures on 
states to uphold their human rights obligations. Yet it is in this area that the most 
obvious and pernicious politicisation occurs at the Council. There are three politicised 
ways in which the Council deals with country situations. It excessively scrutinises some 
countries, altogether ignores other abusers, and shields yet others from action taken 
against abusive regimes.54  
 
An early warning of the Council’s politicisation was seen when it created the 
permanent agenda that is followed at each regular session. In direct contradiction of 
the founding principles of non-selectivity and universality, one country-specific 
situation alone is singled out to be discussed at every regular Council session. Agenda 
Item 7 mandates that the human rights situation in ‘Palestine and other occupied Arab 
territories’ is discussed under its own agenda item rather than in the general item on 
country-situations.55 This is clearly selective, particularly given the persistence of other 
long-standing and equally or more grave crisis regions or situations. That agenda item 
was proposed and supported by OIC members and their allies, and the bloc’s 
dominance enabled it to secure the item on the permanent agenda. Clearly, the 
inclusion of Item 7 related to OIC political objectives despite it obviously violating the 
body’s founding principles.56  
 
Singling out particular countries for excessive and disproportionate focus has been a 
recurring theme throughout the Council’s existence. Israel is not the only example of 
this type of politicisation in relation to country-specific situations. Throughout the 
Council’s decade-long existence certain states find themselves firmly within the body’s 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 R Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council, 6.3. 
55 HRC Res 5/1, ‘Institution-Building Package’, 18 June 2007, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/5/1, Part V (B). 
56 See R Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council 81-83 
spotlight, always owing to severe human rights violations coupled with their ‘pariah’ 
status that means they lack sufficient allies at the Council to shield them from 
disproportionate scrutiny. While those countries do require attention, human rights 
are not zero-sum – the Council only has a limited and finite amount of time for 
discussing and taking action on a broad range of situations, and therefore excessive 
scrutiny detracts from its ability to take needed action elsewhere. As such, its 
excessive focus on one country frequently is a tactic used to deflect attention away 
from other, equally grave, country-specific situations.  
 
Israel57 and Syria58 have at different times found themselves in the category of having 
excess scrutiny as compared with other similar or worse situations elsewhere. Those 
conflicts have killed, injured, displaced, and otherwise seriously harmed large numbers 
of civilians, and of course are deserving of attention within the Human Rights Council, 
and more broadly within the UN. However, the disproportionate attention given to 
those two conflicts as compared with other, similar situations59 that have claimed 
many more victims, at least in part is owing to politicisation of the Council.  
 
It is no coincidence that those two countries form significant part of the political 
objectives of many OIC member states. OIC members dominate at the Council. They 
are the drivers behind the excessive focus on Israel and on Syria. In relation to Syria, 
which is discussed in greater detail in Section 5, OIC objectives vary between different 
member states depending on religious, cultural, geographic, economic and military 
interest in addressing the conflict. In relation to Israel, their objectives include political, 
religious, cultural and regional ties with the Palestinians and with affected 
neighbouring states. Crucially, those countries also use Israel to divert attention away 
from systemic violations within influential OIC members such as Pakistan, Algeria, and 
Egypt. Irrelevant statements, such as on 28th February 2012, in an Urgent Debate on 
Syria, when the OIC Secretary-General drew attention to the situation in Palestine, are 
still used to divert attention away from human rights abusers.60 The problem with 
these sorts of repeat or irrelevant statements is that they waste time and they 
influence the perception of a situation. 
 
Another reason that some countries overtly politicise the conflicts in Israel and in Syria 
is because of the connections with the US and Russia respectively. Israel is seen as 
                                                 
57 See, for example, R. Freedman, ‘The United Nations Human Rights Council: More of the same?’ 209-251 
58 See footnotes 116 and 117 
59 As pointed out by then-Secretary general Kofi Annan: UN Press Release, ‘Secretary General in Message to 
Human Rights Council Cautions against Focusing on Middle East at expense of Darfur, Other Grave Crises’, 29 
November 2006, UN Doc. SG/SM/10769-HR/4907.See, also, Speech by Kofi Annan, 8 December 2006, in which 
he stated ‘we must realize the promise of the Human Rights Council which so far has clearly not justified the 
hopes that so many of us placed in it’. 
60 Human Rights Council News Archive, ‘Human Rights Council hears statements from 17 dignitaries as it 
continues its High-Level Segment’ (29th February 2012) 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11883&;LangID=E 
the US foothold in the Middle East. That relationship encourages anti-US states, such 
as Cuba, China, Venezuela, and Russia, to use Israel as a way of attacking US 
hegemony and interference. Russia’s involvement in Syria has received particularly 
negative reactions from a broad spectrum of states that are not naturally allied with 
one another, many of which appear concerned about recent hegemonic-aspirations 
from that country. The Cold War might long be over, but the practices learnt during 
those times still persist.  
 
It was hoped – perhaps even expected – that the Council would avoid its predecessor’s 
lack of even-handedness in country-specific scrutiny. Indeed, supposed-safeguards 
were built into Resolution 60/251 to achieve that aim.61 Yet the founding principles 
are altogether-ignored when it comes to some country situations. The disproportionate 
attention given to some states can be compared with the failures to address grave 
violations in countries that yield political power in terms of alliances with many Council 
members. Such countries include China, Russia and Egypt, amongst others, all of 
which are known grave abusers and where crises and ongoing abuses have altogether 
been ignored by the Council. When looking at the Council’s composition, it is clear why 
China’s abuses in the lead-up to the Beijing Olympic Games (2008),62 Russia’s 
violations during incursions into Georgia and South Ossetia (2008),63 and the grave 
abuses during Egypt’s revolution have not been discussed at the body.64 Those 
countries have strong alliances across regional groups and political blocs that dominate 
the Council, which means they are shielded from scrutiny and action.65  
 
In between the pariah States and the most politically-powerful countries are the very 
many others that have allies but cannot be protected fully from some attention when 
such attention is merited. Those countries rely on a different form of politicisation 
when the Council shines a spotlight onto grave abuses within their territories. States 
like Sudan and Sri Lanka have received proportionate attention for violations that may 
amount to genocides within their countries, but their allies have politicised discussions 
by shielding them from significant criticism or action. Instead, those allies have 
deflected the focus onto human rights abuses committed by non-state actors within 
those countries or have called upon the international community to support abuser-
governments through capacity-building and technical-assistance despite clear 
evidence that those governments have been behind the grave abuses being 
perpetrated.  
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Sudan is a member both of the African Group and of the OIC, which are respectively 
the largest regional group and largest political bloc at the Council. Sudan therefore 
received significant support from allied states,66 but that support did not fully shield it 
from attention. The weight of evidence meant that violations could not be swept under 
the carpet and that Darfur could not be kept off the Council’s agenda. Instead, Sudan’s 
allies ensured that the Council apportioned blame on other actors for abuses in Darfur 
and called for capacity building and assistance to Sudan’s government.67 Sri Lanka, 
which is a member of the Asian Group and has significant allies within that region as 
well as in key political blocs, relied upon appealing to the LMG, OIC and NAM on issues 
of sovereignty as a method for convincing those States to block action by the Council. 
As will be explored in Section 5, not only was that tactic successful in shielding Sri 
Lanka from criticism but it also undermined the Council’s ability later to take similar, 
needed action on other countries.     
 
The main problem with this approach is that it is used as a tactic to deflect attention 
away from state-sponsored abuses. Calls to support Sudan and the Sri Lanka’s 
government were a method for shielding those States. They did not acknowledge, let 
alone deal with, the government’s responsibility for those violations. Instead, they 
provided a smokescreen that allowed Sudan to continue to collude in the atrocities 
within Darfur and that allowed Sri Lanka to escape accountability for its grave human 
rights abuses. Although claims of lack of capacity may be true in fragile states, they 
are increasingly being used by many countries that have the resources but lack the 
political will to implement rights. Those calls for assistance are taken up by countries’ 
political and regional allies. That stops the Council taking meaningful action on grave 
abuses within those states. Instead, pressure is placed on the UN and aid agencies to 
support governments that are actually perpetrating gross and systemic violations.   
 
 
4. Participation of Non-Governmental Organisations  
 
The webpages of the Human Rights Council tell a story of the participation and 
inclusion of NGOs.68 Practical Guides and Handbooks are available to help NGOs 
understand the work of the Council, its processes, and the ways in which they can 
participate.69 At the Council, NGOs can attend and observe proceedings, submit 
written statements and make oral interventions, as well as organise ‘parallel’ events 
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alongside Council sessions.70 The Council made participation for NGOs even easier by 
introducing video messages for oral submissions, so NGOs can send in their comments 
without paying for a trip to Geneva.71 But the story from the NGO community is not 
so rosy; NGOs are denied accreditation,72 ignored within Council sessions,73 and have 
their participation challenged by states.74 NGO participation is another area where in 
theory there is progress, but in practice, the politicisation of NGO accreditation and 
proceedings has threatened their inclusion at the Council. 
 
There is an increase in the number of NGOs participating in international decision-
making. In 1946 there were 4 NGOs with accreditation, who therefore had access to 
parts of the United Nations, but there was a dramatic increase in the 1990s75 and 
there are currently over 4,189 accredited NGOs.76 Participation at the Council mirrors 
this rise in numbers. At the first session in 2006, 154 NGOs participated,77 and in 2014 
at the 27th Council Session, representatives from approximately 279 NGOs 
participated.78  
 
The UN Charter facilitates consultation with NGOs.79 The Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) outlined the terms for participation and divided NGOs into three types of 
consultative status; General, Special and Roster. General consultative status means 
‘organizations that are concerned with most of the activities of the Council’ and Special 
consultative status means ‘organizations that have a special competence in, and are 
concerned specifically with, only a few of the fields of activity covered by the Council’. 
80 The Roster is a list of NGOs that are considered to be useful on occasions. 
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Consultative status allows for written and oral submissions. This process of applying 
for consultative statues was subsequently adopted by the Council.81  
 
The mandate of the Human Rights Council explicitly provides for the participation of 
NGOs. The Council mandate extols the virtues of NGOs in the protection of human 
rights as it ‘[acknowledges] that non-governmental organizations play an important 
role at the national, regional and international levels, in the promotion and protection 
of human rights’.82 The involvement of NGOs is further buttressed through the 
procedures and processes set out in the UNHRC Institution-Building Package. This 
states that participation should include ‘all relevant stakeholders, including non-
governmental organizations and national human rights institutions’.83  
 
In addition to the provisions within the mandate, the mechanism of Universal Periodic 
Review has facilitated new ways for NGOs to participate at the Council.84 Universal 
Period Review is the review of all states’ human rights record; there are three review 
sessions each year, and at each session a UPR working group will review 16 states. 
Three formal reports are submitted for each state, one of which is a compilation of 
stakeholder submissions. This stakeholder submission allows for the information on 
human rights practices in states and comments from NGOs to form a part of the formal 
reporting process. The review process is in two-parts, the first is a working group 
session that NGOs are allowed to observe but not participate, and the second part is 
a plenary session where NGOs can make ‘general comments’.85 
 
However, there are limitations placed on NGO participation at the Council. The length 
of submissions are dictated by the nature of the status granted to the NGO: General 
consultative status allows 2,000 word submissions and Special consultative status 
allows 1,500 words to bodies like the Council.86 The Council has working modalities 
that outline how an NGO should participate, often restricting the types of comments 
that can be made depending on the type of session.87 Limited time is given for NGO 
oral submissions. Usually NGOs have two or three minutes depending on the type of 
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proceeding and even this can be reduced if Member States overrun in their 
submissions. Moreover, there have been recent attempts to stop NGO participation in 
the Council sessions. There are accusations that some states ‘pressure and intimidate’ 
employees at the Council to allow certain NGOs to speak88 and states use points of 
order to hinder or prevent NGO participation.89  
  
 
Within UPR, the extent of NGO participation is limited.90 Although they provide 
submissions, are present at the first discursive stages, and participate in the plenary 
session,91 the actual scope for NGO influence is restrictive given that the state under 
review is able to determine to which, if any, comments and questions it will respond.92 
Within UPR, authoritarian states have attempted to exclude NGOs from participating.93 
There have also been challenges made by liberal states to the information provided 
by NGOs, especially when the information is about themselves or political allies.94  
 
 
Another area in which NGO participation is politicised is the accreditation of NGOs. To 
participate at the Council, NGOs have to be accredited by ECOSOC. A subsidiary body 
of ECOSOC, the United Nations Committee on Non-governmental organisations, 
comprises 19 member states that recommend NGOs for consultative status. 
Responding to criticisms of a western bias within the Committee, membership is based 
on equitable geographical distribution.95 There are 5 members from African States, 4 
members from Asian States, 2 members from Eastern European States, 4 members 
from Latin American and Caribbean States, and 4 members from Western European 
and other States. When the Committee on NGOs is considering an application, there 
are a number of factors that should guide them.96 NGOs should have a representative 
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structure, possess accountability mechanisms, and they should have an established 
headquarters.97 The Committee should also have regard to the encouragement of 
representation from developing countries and those countries that have transitional 
economies.98 The Committee has four options; to recommend the NGO for 
accreditation, defer an application by asking a question of the NGO that will stall their 
application, vote for a withdrawal of the application, or close an application where the 
NGO is unresponsive. Despite these principles that should guide the questions from 
the Committee, states are still able to ask inappropriate questions of NGOs, thus 
stalling their application for accreditation.99 In some cases, NGOs are asked questions 
repeatedly. For example, at the Committee meeting in June 2016, the International Dalit 
Solidarity Network was considered for the 18th time. Its application had been stalled in the past 
by questions from India. In total, it has received 77 questions from India alone.100 NGOs with 
limited budgets are prevented from participating due to the costs of reapplying. The 
short deadlines to apply for accreditation and the budgetary constraints faced by NGOs 
are just two of a host of procedural reasons why access or participation at the UN is 
curtailed for NGOs.101 
 
 
The Council has explicitly ensured a participatory role for NGOs. The introduction of 
video messaging, the space for organising parallel sessions, and the explicit role of 
NGOs in submissions to UPR is progress towards a more inclusive dialogue on human 
rights.  Nevertheless, the politicisation at the UN Committee for NGOs and the Council 
means that the participation of NGOs and their accreditation is subject to the political 
interests of states.   
 
 
 
 
 
5. Special Sessions 
 
The Council has two new mechanisms that directly address criticisms of the 
Commission and that aim to assist the Council with fulfilling its mandate: Universal 
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Periodic Review (UPR) and Special Sessions. Both mechanisms enhance the Council’s 
ability universally to fulfil its mandate and to respond to serious situations in a timely 
manner. But both have been politicised in much the same way as the Council has 
been. While much has been written about UPR,102 there has been little scrutiny of 
Special Sessions. In this section, we shall look at Special Sessions to demonstrate how 
politicisation has manifested within that mechanism and the impact it has had on the 
Council’s work. 
 
Special Sessions aim at fulfilling the body’s protection mandate and enabling the 
Council to respond swiftly to grave and escalating situations outside. A main failing of 
the Commission was that its annual session allowed neither the time nor the dexterity 
to deal with crisis situations. Special Sessions provides the ability to discuss grave or 
crisis situations inter-sessionally and at short notice. They are separate sessions and, 
because of this, convening Special Sessions enables a quick and focused response 
without using time and resources that had been allocated for other human rights 
matters.  
 
The Council is given the ability ‘to hold special sessions when needed’,103 but is not 
mandated to convene them, rather the mechanism is left open for the Council to 
interpret and utilise as it sees fit. Special Sessions can be held at the request of one 
member, but only if one third of Council members support holding the session.104 It 
was hoped that this requirement would discourage the use of Special Sessions as a 
political tool, whilst still allowing them to be convened quickly and efficiently where 
required. Of course, and as we shall see, that was a rather naïve and idealistic 
expectation. 
 
It was envisaged, particularly by the Global North, that sessions would focus on 
thematic issues; and although that has occurred occasionally – for example regarding 
the global financial crisis,105 the world food crisis106 or transnational terrorism 
committed by ISIS107 – the mechanism’s potential in that regard has not been 
exploited. Failures to convene a Special Session on irregular migration, bondage of 
workers in the Gulf, or other similar situations demonstrate that the mechanism is not 
being used fully for the purposes that its creators intended. Instead, the vast majority 
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of sessions have been convened about country-specific situations and while those are 
also needed it is only half of the mechanism’s mandate and potential.  
 
OHCHR staff involved in creating the Council108 foresaw and forewarned Global North 
states that the mechanism would likely be used instead to target particular country-
specific situations for politicised reasons and that it was likely that the same selectivity 
and bias that occurred at the Commission would plague the Special Session 
mechanisms. During the Council’s early years it swiftly became apparent that the 
warnings ought to have been heeded. 5 of the Council’s first 12 Special Sessions 
focused on Israel and the Occupied Territories. While that is a grave situation, and 
while crises arose during that time, the disproportionate attention can be compared 
with the sole Special Session on Darfur where a genocide was being perpetrated,109 
the sole Special Session on the Congo where more than 6 million people had been 
killed at that time, and the failure to hold any Special Sessions on countries with 
ongoing grave situations of repression, such as North Korea and Zimbabwe, or of 
occupation, such as Morocco and Western Sahara or Turkey and Northern Cyprus. 
Schrijver insists that when the Palestinian plight is considered, Western observations 
that the Council excessively focuses on Israel is questionable.110 However, owing to 
similar, if not worse, abuses ongoing elsewhere, Gaer argues that convening three 
Special Sessions on Israel in the Council’s first six months raised serious concerns 
about the new body and its members.111  
 
The mechanism has similarly been politicised in the ways that it has and has not been 
used to respond to the Arab Spring Uprisings. In 2011 and 2012 there were 4 Special 
Sessions on Syria, a country expelled by the Arab League and that no longer is 
protected by most of its former political allies in the MENA region.112 The situation in 
Syria and how to address the grave crisis has divided opinion within the OIC, so that 
political bloc did not vote en masse to block scrutiny of its member state.113 Selectivity, 
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and disproportionate scrutiny of Syria,114 can be compared with the failure to convene 
a Special Session on Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia or Yemen, or even a thematic session on 
the Arab Spring uprisings generally.   
 
Politicisation through bias, disproportionate attention and selectivity was always a risk, 
but the methods for convening a session increased the likelihood of it occurring. 
Requiring one third of Council members’ support empowers dominant groups and 
alliances to use this mechanism to achieve political aims because the larger the group, 
the more easily the one-third threshold is achieved. Once again, this has manifested 
itself in the mechanism’s use for selective, biased and politicised purposes, such as 
the vastly disproportionate attention being devoted to Israel and Syria whilst other 
similar or more egregious situations were given little or no attention. It is only when 
a state lacks political allies that the spotlight of so many Special Sessions can be shone 
to illuminate the human rights abuses occurring whilst also deflecting attention away 
from other similar situations elsewhere. 
 
A different form of the politicisation of Special Sessions is the way in which countries 
are shielded from scrutiny at sessions that were convened to scrutinise human rights 
abuses in those very same states. That tactic has been deployed most notably in the 
sessions about Darfur and about Sri Lanka. In both of those sessions, allies of those 
countries used bloc and group politicisation tactics to ensure that the scrutiny and 
action intended for those states were diverted to other actors. In terms of the Special 
Session on Darfur, states allied with Sudan ensured that attention was focused on 
non-state actors’ role in the conflict and that support, capacity-building and technical 
assistance was promised to Sudan’s government. While those states had failed to 
shield Sudan from the Council’s attention, both in regular and special sessions, they 
diverted the spotlight away from the government’s abuses and shifted the narrative 
to one of the government being unable to prevent violations.115 That narrative, of 
course, is at odds with the vast majority of information and evidence available at that 
time about the atrocities in Darfur,116 and demonstrates the gross politicisation that 
can and does take place within an intergovernmental forum owing to politics being 
able to supersede the body’s aims and mandate.  
 
Another deeply politicised and ultimately counterproductive session wholly 
undermined the Council’s mandate to protect and promote rights. The EU called for a 
Special Session on Sri Lanka in May 2009, a week after the defeat of the Liberation 
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Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by government forces and the resulting fears about 
massacres etc. The government of Sri Lanka issued a joint communiqué together with 
the UN Secretary-General in which Sri Lanka reiterated its commitment to protecting 
and promoting human rights and the UN Secretary-General emphasised the 
importance of an accountability process. Not only did the Special Session fail to enforce 
accountability, the outcome was a ‘deeply flawed’117 resolution118 that put forward the 
government’s version of events, praised state forces, and pointed the finger only at 
abuses committed by the LTTE. The resolution passed with 29 votes in favour, 12 
against, and 6 abstentions. Most states supporting Sri Lanka were its allies from the 
Asian Group or the NAM, who sought to shield it from Council action. Human Rights 
Watch said that Brazil, Cuba, India, and Pakistan led efforts to block a stronger 
resolution focusing on government abuses. Even more problematically, the resolution 
sought to entrench the position held by many Global South states that the Council 
cannot interfere with the affairs within a state’s domestic jurisdiction even though 
human rights violations are not understood in international law to be part of inherently 
domestic matters and indeed it is anathema to international human rights law to claim 
that abuses are exclusively part of the internal affairs of a sovereign country.  
 
The option to convene Special Sessions on human rights emergencies was an attempt 
to address the failure of the Commission to respond to such situations. Special 
Sessions direct time and resources to addressing particular grave or crisis human 
rights situations. Such an opportunity is a step forward in the protection of human 
rights. Yet, the process of convening a Special Session and the sessions themselves 
have been politicised.    
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
A decade after it was birthed, the United Nations Human Rights Council can be praised 
for its achievements in terms of protection and promotion of human rights, but that 
ought not overshadow the criticisms that must be made and addressed. Steps forward 
– such as the introduction of fundamental principles guiding the work of the Council, 
the greater role for NGOs, and the option of Special Sessions – have been 
accompanied by simultaneous steps backward. Problematically, those steps 
backwards, which we have detailed in this chapter, are ones that mirror the same 
problems as beset its predecessor, the Commission on Human Rights, demonstrating 
that the failings at that body have continued at this new institution. Despite emphasis 
on institutional reform through tinkering with and adjusting specific aspects of the 
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body, the Council has been undermined by States using its mechanisms, discussions 
and sessions to advance unrelated political objectives. Politicisation is widespread at 
the Council, infiltrating the work on country-specific situations, special sessions and 
undermining the role of NGOs. The advancement of national agendas unrelated to 
human rights, it seems, is a major factor that undermines intergovernmental human 
rights bodies at the UN, perhaps demonstrating a need to revisit the discussion on 
whether governmental representatives or independent experts are the most effective 
delegates to such an institution. Or perhaps it is simply time to accept that the UN’s 
main human rights body cannot be expected to, let alone tasked with, independent, 
impartial and objective protection and promotion of human rights – a sorry state of 
affairs, but one that reflects the reality of the situation. 
 
 
